Just when it seemed 2020 could not throw anything else at us, the year's biggest cybersecurity story broke in mid-December. It involves federal agencies, major tech companies, and a piece of IT management software most people outside the industry had never heard of. It also carries a lesson that applies to every business, including the ten-person office down the street.
The lesson is uncomfortable: sometimes the attack comes through the software you trust the most. Here is what we know so far, and what it means for you.
What happened
SolarWinds is a Texas-based company that makes IT monitoring and management tools. Its flagship product, Orion, is used by thousands of organizations, including large corporations and many government agencies, to keep an eye on their networks and servers.
On December 13, it became public that attackers had broken into SolarWinds' own systems and hidden malicious code inside legitimate Orion software updates. Those updates were digitally signed and distributed through the normal channels, and they went out over several months this spring. Customers who did exactly what they were supposed to do, installing vendor updates, ended up installing a backdoor.
SolarWinds has said in a regulatory filing that up to roughly 18,000 customers downloaded the affected versions. Not all of them were actively targeted; the attackers appear to have used the backdoor selectively, going deeper only into organizations they cared about. Reported victims so far include several U.S. government departments, and the breach was uncovered after the security firm FireEye announced it had been hacked and started investigating how. Government officials and researchers describe it as a sophisticated, patient operation, widely attributed to a nation-state.
The federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency issued an emergency directive the same day telling agencies to disconnect or power down affected Orion systems. The investigation is still very much underway, and more details will surely come out in the weeks ahead.
What "supply chain attack" means
Most attacks target you directly: a phishing email to your staff, a guessed password, an unpatched server. A supply chain attack goes after someone you rely on, then rides that trust into your network.
Think of it like a trusted delivery driver who has a key to your building. You would never let a stranger in, but you let the driver in every week without a second thought. If someone compromises the driver, they walk right past every lock you own.
In a supply chain attack, you do not make a mistake. You do the right thing, and it gets used against you.
"We are not a government agency. Why should we care?"
It is true that a small business in Clearwater or New Port Richey is unlikely to be the intended target of an operation like this one. But there are real reasons to take it seriously:
- The technique will be copied. Criminal groups watch what works. Compromising one software vendor to reach thousands of its customers is an efficient approach, and smaller, less well-defended vendors make easier targets than SolarWinds.
- Your business runs on vendors, too. Your accounting software, your practice management system, your payroll provider, and the remote support tools your IT provider uses all have some level of access to your systems or data.
- IT tools are powerful by design. Monitoring and management software needs broad access to do its job. That same access is what makes it so valuable to an attacker.
Questions worth asking your vendors
You cannot audit every software company you do business with, and you should not have to. But you can ask a few pointed questions, especially of vendors and service providers with deep access to your network:
- How do you secure your own systems and the way you build and deliver updates?
- Do you use multi-factor authentication for every employee who can reach customer systems?
- How and how quickly would you tell us if you were breached?
- What access do you actually have to our network, and is it more than you need?
- If we had to cut off your access in a hurry, how would we do it?
The answers do not need to be perfect. What you are looking for is a vendor who takes the question seriously and has thought about it before you asked.
Why monitoring and "least access" matter
The SolarWinds backdoor was designed to be quiet. It reportedly waited before doing anything and tried to blend in with normal traffic. That is a reminder that prevention alone is not a strategy. Somebody also needs to be watching for things that look slightly off, like a server talking to an unfamiliar address on the internet, or an account logging in at odd hours.
The other big idea is limiting blast radius. If every tool and every account has only the access it truly needs, a compromise of one piece does less damage. That means separate admin accounts, network segmentation where it makes sense, and not giving any single product the keys to everything unless it truly requires them. This is the kind of steady, behind-the-scenes work that good managed IT services are supposed to cover.
What to do now
- Find out whether any SolarWinds Orion product is in use in your environment, directly or by a provider on your behalf. If it is, follow SolarWinds' and CISA's guidance immediately.
- Make a simple list of the vendors and tools that have remote access to your systems or hold sensitive data.
- Ask those vendors the questions above, starting with the ones that have the most access.
- Remove access for any vendor or tool you no longer use.
- Turn on multi-factor authentication for every admin and remote access account.
- Make sure someone is actually reviewing security alerts and unusual network activity, not just collecting them.
- Confirm you have backups that are separate from your main network, since a lot of today's attacks, as we covered in our post on data-stealing ransomware, go well beyond a single machine.
Nobody can promise that a trusted vendor will never be compromised. What you can do is know who has access, keep that access tight, and have someone watching. If you would like help taking stock of your vendors and tools, send us a note at info@pinellasit.com or use our contact form. We hope you get a quiet, restful holiday.
