Six weeks ago we wrote about WannaCry and why keeping Windows patched matters. On June 27, another outbreak made that same point, then went a step further and showed how an attack can arrive through a door most businesses never think to lock: a software update from a vendor you trust.
The malware has been given a few names — Petya, ExPetr, and the one that seems to be sticking, NotPetya. It started in Ukraine and quickly spread to multinational companies, including shipping giant Maersk, pharmaceutical company Merck, and a long list of manufacturers, law firms and logistics companies. A week later, some of them are still putting their networks back together.
How it got in: a poisoned update
The starting point was M.E.Doc, a tax and accounting program widely used by businesses in Ukraine. Attackers compromised the software's update system, so when companies' computers checked for the latest version, they downloaded the malware instead. The businesses did nothing wrong in the usual sense. Nobody opened a sketchy attachment. They simply let a legitimate program update itself, the way we all tell people to.
That is what security people mean by a supply-chain attack: instead of breaking into you directly, the attacker breaks into someone you already trust and rides in on their access.
How it spread once inside
Once it was running on one computer, NotPetya moved through the network aggressively. It used the same EternalBlue flaw in Windows file sharing that WannaCry used, for machines that were still unpatched. But it also did something nastier: it grabbed administrator credentials from the infected computer's memory and used ordinary Windows administration tools to log in to other machines. That means even fully patched computers could be infected if an administrator account had been used on a compromised machine.
This is why companies with multiple offices, including offices in other countries, were hit so hard. A single infected PC at a Ukrainian branch could reach the rest of a global network within hours if that network was flat and administrator accounts were shared everywhere.
Ransomware in name only
Infected computers displayed a ransom note asking for $300 in Bitcoin. But security researchers who took the malware apart quickly concluded that the ransom was mostly a costume. The way it scrambled disks meant the data could not realistically be recovered even if the attacker wanted to help. On top of that, the email address victims were told to contact was shut down by its provider shortly after the outbreak started, so there was no way to even ask.
Many researchers now describe NotPetya as a wiper: malware designed to destroy, dressed up as ransomware. For businesses that got hit, the practical meaning is simple — the only way back was to rebuild machines and restore from backups.
With NotPetya, paying the ransom was never the way out. Backups were.
Why a Florida small business should pay attention
You probably do not run Ukrainian tax software. But almost every business runs software that updates itself: accounting packages, practice management systems, point-of-sale, remote support tools, browser plugins. Many small businesses also give a vendor remote access to a server so they can support a line-of-business application. Each of those is a trusted connection into your network.
You cannot personally audit every vendor's security. What you can control is how much damage one compromised program or one compromised PC is able to do once it is inside. That comes down to a few things.
Limit the blast radius
- Segment the network. Guest Wi-Fi, office PCs, servers, and devices like cameras and phones should not all sit on one flat network. Separating them means an infection in one area has a harder time reaching the rest.
- Protect administrator accounts. NotPetya spread by reusing admin credentials. Staff should not log in to their daily PCs as administrators, and the domain admin account should not be used for everyday tasks. Where possible, give each local administrator account a unique password rather than one shared across every machine.
- Keep patching. Machines with the March MS17-010 update were immune to the EternalBlue half of the attack. That still matters.
- Know your vendors' access. Make a list of every outside company with remote access or auto-updating software on your network. Ask what you would do if one of them were compromised.
Offline backups are the real safety net
When the malware is designed to destroy, recovery is everything. The businesses that bounce back quickly from something like NotPetya are the ones that have backups the attacker could not reach, and a tested plan for using them. That means:
- At least one backup copy that is offline or offsite and cannot be reached with the same network credentials the rest of the office uses.
- Backups of whole systems, not just files, so a server can be rebuilt in hours rather than days.
- A tested restore: you know how long it takes, who does it, and in what order systems come back.
This is exactly the ground our backup and disaster recovery service covers, from the backup itself to the plan for getting back on your feet.
What to do now
- Confirm the MS17-010 patch is installed on every Windows machine, and disable SMBv1 where you can.
- Stop using administrator accounts for everyday work, and stop sharing one admin password across all PCs.
- List every vendor with remote access or self-updating software, and remove access nobody uses anymore.
- Separate guest, office and server traffic on your network.
- Make sure one backup copy is offline or offsite, and test a full restore of your most important server.
Two major outbreaks in two months is not a coincidence; it is a sign of where things are headed. None of the fixes above are exotic, but they do take some planning. If you would like a second set of eyes on your network or your backups, reach out at info@pinellasit.com — we are glad to help.
