This one hit close to home. On Friday, February 5, someone remotely took control of a computer at the City of Oldsmar's water treatment plant, right here in upper Pinellas County, and tried to change the amount of a chemical going into the water supply. The Pinellas County Sheriff's Office announced it at a press conference on Monday, and the story has been national news ever since.
Nobody was harmed, thanks largely to a plant operator who was paying attention. But the way the intruder got in is something we see at businesses around Tampa Bay every week, and that makes it worth talking about.
What happened
Based on what the Sheriff's Office has described publicly, the plant had remote access software installed on a computer used to control the treatment process. That software, TeamViewer, lets an authorized person connect to a computer from somewhere else and see and control the screen as if they were sitting in front of it.
That Friday, an operator noticed someone briefly connecting to the system in the morning. That in itself was not alarming, since remote access was used legitimately. Then, in the early afternoon, it happened again, and this time the operator watched the mouse move across the screen on its own. The intruder opened the controls and raised the setting for sodium hydroxide, commonly called lye, from 100 parts per million to 11,100 parts per million. Sodium hydroxide is used in small amounts to manage the water's acidity. At that level it would be dangerous.
The operator immediately set it back to normal. Officials said other safeguards would also have caught the change before treated water reached anyone, and that the city has since disabled the remote access program. The FBI and Secret Service are involved, and as of today nobody knows who was behind it or where they were connecting from.
Why a small business should care
It would be easy to read this as a story about critical infrastructure and move on. That would miss the point. The tool involved was not exotic industrial hacking gear. It was an ordinary remote access program, the same kind many offices use so the owner can check the office PC from home or a vendor can support a piece of equipment.
If a remote access tool can reach a computer from the internet, so can anyone who gets hold of the login.
We often find remote access software on small business computers that nobody remembers installing. A former employee set it up. A software vendor put it on for support years ago. Someone used a free version to work from home one weekend. Each one is a door into the business, and many of them are protected by a single password that has not changed in a long time.
The usual weak spots
Investigators have not finished their work, and we will not guess at the plant's exact setup. But incidents like this almost always come back to the same handful of problems, and they are worth checking in your own office:
- Shared passwords. When several people use the same login for a remote access tool, you cannot tell who connected, you cannot shut off one person without affecting everyone, and the password tends to spread and never change.
- No multi-factor authentication. Most remote access products offer a second factor, like an app on your phone. Without it, a leaked or guessed password is all anyone needs.
- Unsupported operating systems. Windows 7 stopped receiving security updates over a year ago, as we covered in our post on Windows 7 end of support. Yet we still run into it on machines tucked away in back rooms running a single piece of equipment or software.
- Always-on access. Remote tools left running 24/7 on a sensitive computer, even when nobody needs them, give an attacker unlimited time to try.
- Critical systems on the same network as everything else. The computer that runs your equipment or holds your most sensitive data should not be one click away from the PC where someone checks personal email.
The part that went right
It is worth giving credit where it is due. The operator noticed something was off, trusted that instinct, and acted right away. That is exactly the behavior you want from your own team. If someone sees their mouse moving by itself, a strange pop-up asking for permission to connect, or a login alert they did not trigger, they should feel comfortable saying so immediately and loudly. Nobody should worry about looking foolish for raising a false alarm.
Doing remote access safely
Remote access is not the villain here. Businesses genuinely need it, especially now that so many people work from home at least part of the time. The goal is to do it deliberately rather than by accident. We walked through the options in more detail in our post on remote access done right, but the core ideas are simple: every person gets their own account, every account uses multi-factor authentication, access is limited to what each person needs, and every connection is logged so you can see who got in and when.
What to do this week
- Find every remote access program installed on your business computers, including TeamViewer, AnyDesk, LogMeIn, and similar tools. Remove anything nobody can explain.
- Replace shared remote access logins with individual accounts.
- Turn on multi-factor authentication for every remote access tool that supports it.
- Change any passwords that have been shared with former employees or vendors.
- Identify any computers still running Windows 7 or older and make a plan to upgrade or isolate them.
- Keep your most sensitive systems separated from general office computers.
- Tell your staff what to do if they see their computer being controlled by someone else: unplug the network cable and call for help.
The Oldsmar incident had a good ending because one person was watching at the right moment. You should not have to count on that kind of luck. If you would like someone to take inventory of the remote access tools in your office and lock them down properly, our cybersecurity team works with businesses across Pinellas and Pasco every day. Reach out at info@pinellasit.com or through our contact form.
