On the Monday before Thanksgiving, employees at Sony Pictures Entertainment arrived at work to find an image of a red skeleton on their screens and a message from a group calling itself the "Guardians of Peace." Within hours the company had shut down its network. In the weeks since, the story has only grown.
Unreleased movies have appeared on file-sharing sites. Executives' private emails have been published and picked apart in the press. Employees' Social Security numbers, salaries, and medical information have leaked. And according to widespread reports, staff spent days working with pen and paper, fax machines, and old phones while the company rebuilt its systems. The investigation is ongoing, and a lot is still unknown. But some lessons are already clear.
What happened
Based on what has been reported so far, the attackers did two things. First, they quietly copied a very large amount of data out of Sony's network — films, scripts, emails, contracts, and personnel files. Second, they deployed malware designed to destroy data, wiping the drives of a large number of company computers and servers and leaving them unable to start.
Shortly after the attack, the FBI reportedly warned U.S. businesses about destructive malware of this kind. The stolen material has since been released in batches, keeping the story in the headlines for weeks.
A different kind of attack
Most cyber attacks that affect small businesses are about money. Criminals steal card numbers to sell, or lock files with ransomware like CryptoLocker and demand payment to unlock them. There is a business logic to it, which in an odd way makes it predictable.
The Sony attack was different. The attackers were not asking for a ransom to restore the systems. They wanted to cause damage and embarrassment. Destructive attacks like this are not entirely new — in 2012, a wiper attack at Saudi Aramco reportedly erased data on tens of thousands of computers — but the Sony attack is the most visible example yet against a U.S. company.
When the goal is destruction, there is no negotiating your way out. Your recovery plan is the only plan.
Why a small business should care
You are not a Hollywood studio, and nobody is likely to target your business for political reasons. But the practical question the Sony attack raises applies to everyone: if every computer in your office were erased tomorrow, how long would it take to get back to work?
For a small business, a total wipe does not have to come from a sophisticated attacker. It can come from ransomware that encrypts everything it can reach, a disgruntled former employee with a login that was never disabled, a fire, a flood, or a hurricane. The result looks the same: your computers are useless, and what you can recover depends entirely on what you prepared ahead of time.
Backups that survive the attack
Here is the uncomfortable truth about many small-business backup setups. The backup is an external drive plugged into the server, or a folder on the network that every computer can reach. That works fine for a failed hard drive. It does nothing against an attack that wipes or encrypts everything connected to the network, because the backup is connected too.
A backup strategy that can survive a destructive attack needs:
- At least one copy offline or off-site, not reachable from your everyday network. A rotated drive taken home, a secure cloud backup with separate credentials, or both.
- Multiple versions over time, so you can go back to before the damage started.
- Full system images, not just files, so servers can be rebuilt quickly instead of reinstalled from scratch.
- Regular test restores. A backup you have never restored from is a guess.
Have an incident plan before you need it
The Sony story shows how chaotic the first days of a major incident can be. Email is down, so how do you reach staff? Who decides whether to shut down the network? Who calls the bank, the insurance company, a lawyer? How do you keep taking orders or seeing patients?
A small business does not need a hundred-page binder. It needs a page or two answering those questions, with phone numbers written down somewhere other than the computer that might be wiped. It also helps to decide in advance which systems come back first, and what a day of "working on paper" would actually look like for your business.
Limit the damage in the first place
Preparing to recover is essential, but reducing how far an attacker can get helps too:
- Limit administrator accounts. Wiping many machines at once usually requires powerful credentials. Fewer people with them means fewer targets.
- Separate sensitive data so not every account can reach everything.
- Remove old accounts promptly when people leave.
- Watch for unusual activity, like large amounts of data leaving the network.
- Keep systems patched and train staff to spot phishing, still the most common way in.
Your year-end checklist
- Confirm you have a backup copy that is offline or off-site and not reachable from your network.
- Test a restore of a key server or database before the new year.
- Write a short incident plan with contacts, decisions, and priorities, and print it.
- Review who has administrator access and remove what is not needed.
- Disable accounts of anyone who no longer works for you.
- Think through how your business would operate for a week without computers.
Most businesses will never face an attack like the one at Sony. But every business will, sooner or later, face a day when the computers do not work. The difference between a bad day and a business-ending week is preparation. If you would like help building backups that can survive the worst case, or a recovery plan your team can actually follow, our backup and disaster recovery team is here to help. Reach out at info@pinellasit.com.
