On August 16, more than twenty local governments across Texas were hit with ransomware on the same morning. Most were small towns, the kind of places with a handful of computers at city hall and no full-time IT staff. State officials counted 22 affected entities, and local officials in at least one town said publicly that the attackers got in through the outside IT provider they shared with other affected towns.
It was not an isolated case. Throughout 2019, security researchers and the IT industry have reported a steady stream of incidents where criminals broke into IT service providers and then used the provider's own remote management tools to push ransomware out to clients. Late last month, hundreds of dental offices in Wisconsin were reportedly hit through a company that provided their backup service. The pattern is clear, and it is worth understanding, whether you work with an outside IT company or not.
Why attackers go after IT providers
Managed IT providers are trusted by design. To keep your computers patched, monitored, and backed up, your provider needs access to them, often through remote monitoring and management software installed on every machine. That access is what lets a technician fix a problem without driving to your office.
From an attacker's point of view, that trust is a shortcut. Instead of breaking into fifty small businesses one at a time, they can try to break into the one company that already has access to all fifty. If they succeed, the same tools used to install updates can be used to install ransomware, everywhere at once.
This is not a reason to avoid outside IT help. Most small businesses are far safer with a professional provider than without one. But it does mean the security of your provider is now part of your own security, and it is fair to ask how they handle it.
Your IT provider holds the keys to your network. It is reasonable to ask how they protect those keys.
Questions to ask your IT provider
A good provider will welcome these questions and answer them plainly. If you get vague answers, defensiveness, or "don't worry about it," that tells you something too.
1. Do you use multi-factor authentication on your own tools?
Every login to the provider's remote management platform, remote access tools, documentation system, and email should require a second factor beyond a password. A stolen or guessed password alone should never be enough to reach your network. This is the single most important question on the list.
2. Who on your team can access our systems, and with what permissions?
Not every technician needs full administrative access to every client. Ask whether access is limited by role, whether each technician has an individual account (not a shared login), and what happens to that access when someone leaves the company.
3. How do you keep your own tools updated?
Several of this year's incidents reportedly involved outdated software or plugins in the provider's own toolset. A provider that patches your machines religiously should hold its own systems to the same standard.
4. Are actions in your tools logged, and does anyone review them?
If a script suddenly runs on every client machine at 2 a.m., someone should notice. Ask whether the provider keeps logs of who did what and when, and whether unusual activity triggers alerts.
5. Are our backups protected from your tools?
This one is subtle but important. If the same access that manages your computers can also delete your backups, an attacker who gets in can wipe both. Ask whether at least one copy of your backups is kept somewhere that cannot be altered or deleted with the everyday management tools.
6. What happens if you are breached?
Ask how quickly you would be told, what the provider would do to contain the damage, and whether they have a written incident response plan. No one likes this question, but a provider who has thought it through is a provider you want.
How a responsible provider approaches this
Without getting into any specific product, here is what a well-run IT provider generally does to reduce this risk:
- Treats its own network as a high-value target, because it is one, and applies stricter security internally than it asks of clients.
- Requires multi-factor authentication everywhere, with no exceptions for "just this one tool."
- Follows least privilege, giving each person only the access their job requires and removing it promptly when roles change.
- Keeps its tools current and removes old integrations and plugins that are no longer used.
- Separates backups so a compromise of one system does not take out the ability to recover.
- Is transparent with clients about how access works and is willing to discuss it.
What to do now
- Make a list of every outside company with remote access to your systems: your IT provider, software vendors, copier companies, phone vendors, and anyone else.
- Ask each of them the questions above, starting with multi-factor authentication.
- Remove access for any vendor that no longer needs it.
- Confirm you have a backup copy that no outside party can delete.
- Make sure you know who to call, and how, if a vendor tells you it has been compromised.
The bottom line
The Texas attacks are a wake-up call for the whole IT industry, and a reminder for business owners that trust should come with transparency. Working with an outside provider is still one of the smartest moves a small business can make. Just make sure the provider protects its own house as carefully as it protects yours. If you have questions about how managed IT services should handle access and security, or want a second opinion on your current setup, email us at info@pinellasit.com. We are happy to talk it through.
