Most people have learned to laugh off the classic scam email. The prince with a fortune to share, the "Dear Valued Customer" with a mangled logo, the bank you don't even use asking you to verify your account. Those messages are sent to millions of addresses at once, hoping a tiny percentage will bite.
Spear phishing is different. It's one email, written for one person, by someone who did their homework. It uses your name, your boss's name, a vendor you actually work with, maybe a detail from a conference you posted about last week. It doesn't feel like a scam, and that's the whole idea.
How attackers do their research
It takes surprisingly little effort to learn enough about a small business to write a convincing email. Nearly all of it is public:
- Your website often lists staff names, titles, and email addresses, which reveals your email format (first.last@, first initial plus last name, and so on).
- LinkedIn shows who works in accounting, who just started, who reports to whom, and which vendors or partners people are connected to.
- Facebook and Twitter tell the world when the owner is traveling, when the office is closed, or which trade show the team is at.
- Press releases and local news announce new hires, new clients, and new locations.
Put those pieces together and an attacker can write an email from "the owner" to the new bookkeeper while the owner is at a conference in Orlando, asking for a quick payment to a vendor the company really uses. Every detail checks out, except the one that matters.
What a spear phishing email looks like
These messages come in a few common flavors:
- The executive request. "Are you at your desk? I need you to handle a wire transfer today. I'm tied up in meetings, just email me when it's done."
- The vendor update. "We've changed banks. Please update our payment details before the next invoice."
- The shared document. "Here's the proposal we discussed," with a link to a fake Office 365 or Google sign-in page designed to capture your password.
- The relevant attachment. A résumé sent to someone who just posted a job opening, or an invoice sent to accounts payable, containing malware.
The stakes can be large. Last year, networking company Ubiquiti disclosed that it lost tens of millions of dollars after employees were fooled by emails impersonating executives and outside parties. Small businesses are hit by the same tactics every day. The dollar amounts are smaller, but so is the cushion to absorb them.
A spear phishing email doesn't have to fool everyone. It only has to fool the one person it was written for.
How to spot one
Because these emails are well written, the usual advice about spelling mistakes doesn't help much. Train people to look at the request itself instead:
- Unusual urgency or secrecy. "Keep this between us." "It has to go out before 3." Pressure is the attacker's best tool.
- A change in how money or data moves. New bank details, a new payee, a request for employee records. These always deserve a second look.
- The sender address, not the name. The display name may say your owner's name while the address is a free webmail account or a domain one letter off from yours. Check where a reply would actually go.
- Unexpected sign-in pages. If a link asks you to log in to see a document, stop. Go to the site directly instead of through the link, and look carefully at the web address.
- "This isn't how we normally do this." The single best warning sign. If the owner never emails about wires, an email about a wire is suspicious no matter how real it looks.
Process beats suspicion
You can't expect people to catch every clever email by instinct. What works is a few firm rules that apply no matter how legitimate a message seems:
- Verify payment and banking changes by phone, using a number you already had on file, never one from the email.
- Require two people for wire transfers above a set amount.
- Never send sensitive data (payroll, W-2s, customer records) in response to an email request alone.
- Make it safe to double-check. The owner should say, out loud, that nobody will ever be in trouble for calling to confirm.
Filtering and technical controls still matter
Technology won't catch everything here, but it removes a lot of the risk. A good email filtering service can flag messages from lookalike domains, tag emails from outside the company with a visible warning, strip or sandbox risky attachments, and check links when they're clicked. Setting up SPF, DKIM, and DMARC records for your domain makes it harder for attackers to send email that appears to come from your exact address. And two-step verification on email accounts means a stolen password from a fake login page isn't enough to get in.
Training ties it together. Short, regular refreshers with real examples, and occasionally a simulated phishing test, keep the warning signs fresh. We include this kind of training and filtering in our cybersecurity services.
What to do now
- Look at your website and LinkedIn presence the way an attacker would. Consider whether every name, title, and direct email needs to be public.
- Write down your payment verification rule and share it with everyone who touches money.
- Add an "external sender" warning to incoming email if you don't have one.
- Check that your domain has SPF, DKIM, and DMARC set up.
- Turn on two-step verification for email accounts.
- Hold a 15-minute team huddle with a few real spear phishing examples.
- Make sure everyone knows who to tell, and how fast, if they think they clicked something.
The bottom line
Spear phishing works because it's personal. The defense is personal too: people who know what to look for, simple rules that don't bend for urgent emails, and filtering that catches what it can before it lands. If you'd like help putting those pieces in place for your team, reach out through our contact form or at info@pinellasit.com.
