Two weeks ago Google did something big companies almost never do: it stood up and said, publicly, that it had been hacked. The company described a highly sophisticated, targeted attack on its corporate network, traced back to China, that also hit a long list of other large companies. Security researchers have since nicknamed it "Operation Aurora."
It is tempting to file this under "problems for billion-dollar companies." A dental office in Largo or a title company in Clearwater is not sitting on Google's source code. But the way the attackers got in was not exotic at all. It started with an employee, a link, and a web browser that had an unpatched hole in it. That combination exists in almost every small office we walk into.
What actually happened
Based on what Google, Microsoft, and several security firms have made public, the broad outline looks like this:
- Attackers picked specific people inside the targeted companies and sent them a link, reportedly through email or instant messages that looked like they came from someone they knew.
- Clicking the link opened a web page that exploited a previously unknown flaw in Internet Explorer. Just visiting the page was enough; no download prompt, no warning.
- That flaw let the attackers quietly install software giving them remote control of the victim's computer. From there, they worked their way deeper into the network.
Google said at least twenty other large companies were targeted, and Adobe has confirmed it was among them. Google also said one goal appeared to be accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists.
Microsoft confirmed the Internet Explorer flaw and released an emergency, out-of-cycle security update last Thursday. The governments of Germany and France went so far as to advise their citizens to use a different browser until a fix was available. When national governments start giving browser advice, you know it was serious.
"Targeted" doesn't mean "only big companies"
The word that got everyone's attention was targeted. Instead of spraying millions of junk emails and hoping someone bites, the attackers researched specific people and crafted messages just for them. That feels like a big-company problem, but the same approach works beautifully on small businesses, for a few reasons:
- Small businesses hold valuable things. Online banking logins, customer credit card data, patient records, and access to bigger clients' systems are all worth stealing.
- Small businesses are easier. There is usually no security team, no one watching the network, and a lot of computers that haven't been updated in months.
- Your information is public. Your website lists your staff. Your office manager's name is on the voicemail. A convincing "Hey, here's that invoice" email takes about five minutes to put together.
And even the untargeted, mass-mailed attacks now use the same trick: a link to a booby-trapped web page that exploits an unpatched browser or plug-in. The Aurora attack just happened to aim that trick at famous names.
The most sophisticated part of Operation Aurora was the flaw it used. Everything else, a believable message and one click, is ordinary.
Why the old browser matters so much
Reports indicate the attacks were aimed largely at older versions of Internet Explorer, particularly Internet Explorer 6, which is still installed on a surprising number of business PCs. IE6 came out in 2001. Newer versions of Internet Explorer have additional protections built in that make this kind of attack harder to pull off, and Microsoft's fix covers the newer versions too.
We see IE6 hanging around in offices for understandable reasons. Some older line-of-business web applications were built for it and nobody wants to find out what happens if it changes. But running a nine-year-old browser for everyday web surfing is like leaving the back door propped open because one delivery driver finds it convenient. If an old application truly needs IE6, that is a problem worth solving on purpose, not by leaving every machine exposed.
Running as administrator makes everything worse
Here is the part that almost nobody outside IT talks about. On most small business networks, everyone logs into their Windows XP computer with an account that has full administrator rights. It's easier: people can install printer drivers and toolbars without calling anyone.
The problem is that when malware gets in through the browser, it runs with whatever rights you have. If you are an administrator, so is the attacker. They can install whatever they like, switch off your antivirus, and dig in so deeply that cleaning the machine means wiping it. When people log in with a standard user account, a lot of attacks either fail outright or do far less damage. It is one of the cheapest, most effective protections available, and it costs nothing but a little up-front setup.
What to do now
You don't need a security team to close most of the gaps Aurora exploited. You need a few habits, done consistently:
- Install Microsoft's emergency update now on every PC, including the one in the back room that nobody uses much. Then make sure Windows Update is actually running and succeeding going forward.
- Get off Internet Explorer 6. Move to Internet Explorer 8 or another current browser. If an old application requires IE6, keep it to that one use and talk to the vendor about an update.
- Update the plug-ins too. Adobe Reader, Flash, and Java are attacked just as often as the browser itself, and they don't always update themselves.
- Stop running everyday accounts as administrator. Give staff standard accounts and keep a separate admin login for installs.
- Keep antivirus current and actually check it. An expired subscription quietly protects no one.
- Talk to your staff. A short reminder that "even a message from someone you know can be fake" goes a long way. If a link is unexpected, ask before clicking.
The bottom line
Operation Aurora made headlines because of who got hit. The lesson for everyone else is less dramatic and more useful: attackers go after the easiest way in, and that is usually an unpatched browser and a user with too many privileges. Keeping machines updated and locked down is not glamorous, but it is exactly what stops this kind of attack. If you would like a second set of eyes on how your office handles patching, browsers, and user accounts, our cybersecurity team is happy to take a look. Drop us a line at info@pinellasit.com.
