For the past three weeks, a lot of medical and dental offices have been doing something they have not done in years: tracking claims on spreadsheets, calling pharmacies to confirm prescriptions went through, and watching the bank balance with growing unease. None of those practices were breached. Their clearinghouse was.
On February 21, Change Healthcare, part of UnitedHealth Group's Optum business, discovered a cyberattack and disconnected its systems. Change sits in the middle of an enormous share of American healthcare transactions, so when it went dark, prescriptions, eligibility checks, and insurance claims stalled for providers and pharmacies across the country. As of this writing, parts of the network are coming back, but many practices are still feeling it. Here is what we know, and what smaller practices can take from it.
What happened, in plain terms
Change Healthcare processes claims, payments, and pharmacy transactions for a huge number of providers, insurers, and pharmacies. After detecting the intrusion, the company took its systems offline to contain it. The company has said the attacker identified itself as the ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware group, a well-known criminal operation.
Pharmacies were among the first to feel it, with some unable to process insurance for prescriptions and switching to workarounds or cash. For physician and dental practices, the bigger issue has been money: claims not being submitted, remittances not coming back, and payments not arriving. Optum has launched a temporary funding assistance program, and federal health agencies have announced steps to help providers with cash flow, but plenty of smaller offices are stretched thin in the meantime.
The full story, including exactly how the attackers got in and what patient data may have been taken, is still coming out. We will stick to what has been reported, but the practical lessons do not depend on those details.
Lesson 1: Your risk includes your vendors
Most practice owners think of cybersecurity as protecting their own computers and their own patient records. That still matters. But this attack shows that a practice can be seriously hurt by an incident it had no ability to prevent, simply because a critical partner went down.
Take a few minutes to list the outside services your practice truly cannot function without:
- Your clearinghouse and payment processor
- Your practice management and EHR system, especially if it is cloud-hosted
- E-prescribing
- Your phone and internet provider
- Your payroll service
For each one, ask: if this disappeared for three weeks starting tomorrow, what would we do? If the answer is "I have no idea," that is the gap to close.
Lesson 2: Cash flow is part of continuity
When people talk about disaster recovery, they usually mean restoring servers and files. The Change Healthcare outage is a reminder that a business can have every computer working perfectly and still be in trouble because the money stopped moving.
A practical continuity plan for a practice should cover:
- A backup clearinghouse. A practice that already has a relationship with a second clearinghouse can switch far faster than one starting from scratch. Enrollment with payers takes time, so do it before you need it.
- A cash cushion or line of credit that can carry payroll and rent through several weeks of delayed reimbursements.
- Paper and manual procedures your front desk has actually practiced, including how to capture charges so nothing is lost once systems return.
- A contact list for payers, your bank, and key vendors that does not live only inside the system that might be down.
Lesson 3: Protect your own remote access
Ransomware groups like ALPHV have a well-known playbook: get in through stolen passwords or exposed remote access, move quietly through the network, steal data, then encrypt systems. Large organizations get the headlines, but small practices are targeted by exactly the same techniques, often with less resistance.
The most effective defenses are not exotic:
- Multi-factor authentication on every remote access path, including VPNs, remote desktop tools, cloud portals, and email. A stolen password alone should never be enough to get in.
- No remote desktop exposed directly to the internet. It remains one of the most common ways attackers get into small offices.
- Prompt patching of firewalls, VPN appliances, and servers.
- Endpoint detection and response that can spot and stop ransomware behavior, not just known viruses.
Lesson 4: Backups that attackers cannot reach
If your own systems were hit, could you recover them? Modern ransomware crews go looking for backups first, specifically so victims have no choice but to pay. Backups need to be offsite, protected by separate credentials, ideally immutable (unchangeable for a set period), and tested regularly. A backup you have never restored is a hope, not a plan. HIPAA also expects covered entities to have a contingency plan that includes data backup and disaster recovery, so this is a compliance issue as well as a practical one.
What to do now
- List your critical third-party services and what you would do if each went down for a month.
- Talk to your billing team about enrolling with a secondary clearinghouse.
- Review cash reserves or credit available to cover a gap in reimbursements.
- Confirm MFA is on for every remote access method and every email account.
- Verify your backups are offsite, protected, and recently tested with a real restore.
- Write down, and rehearse, your front-desk downtime procedures.
The takeaway
The Change Healthcare attack is still unfolding, and there will be more to learn. But the core lesson for smaller practices is already clear: resilience is about more than your own firewall. It is knowing what you depend on and having a way to keep serving patients and getting paid when something breaks. Planning for that is exactly what our backup and disaster recovery work is built around. If you would like help thinking through your practice's plan, email info@pinellasit.com or use our contact form.
